RSS
Possibility of Miracles
Religious Experience, Justification, and History (Cambridge: 1999) p. 13.
We can never assert that, in principle, an event resists naturalistic explanation. A perfectly substantiated, anomalous event, rather than providing evidence for the supernatural, merely calls into question our understanding of particular natural laws. In the modern era, this position fairly accurately represents the educated response to novelty. Rather than invoke the supernatural, we can always adjust our knowledge of the natural in extreme cases. In the modern age in actual inquiry, we never reach the point where we throw up our hands and appeal to divine intervention to explain a localized event like an extraordinary experience.
C. S. Lewis (Harper SanFrancisco: Feb 2001), 304 pages.
This book by CS Lewis was probably his most philosophical work. As such, it is not a light read at all and would probably prove difficult for beginners who have not been exposed to heavily philosophical material. But for those who want a highly intellectual philosophical discussion of the possibility of miracles, this book is certainly worthy of one's attention. There are a number of strengths to this book which continue to make the book solidly relevant better than forty years after the revised edition came out. Lewis cuts to the heart of the matter very quickly in asserting that rejection of miracles apriori is a common attitude that at its core, is anti-intellectual. Attempts to base rejection of miracles on probabilities, as Hume tried to do, are philosophically untenable and require a betrayal of basic realities that are universally accepted. Lewis then systematically dismantles the worldview that tends to most cradle apriori miracle rejection, naturalism. He compellingly shows that naturalism is a worldview that cannot stand up to philosophical scrutiny. Key to Lewis's presentation is his argument that naturalism can be demonstrated to be false in its complete rejection of supernaturalism merely by the reality of reason. Logic and reason of the mind, by themselves, are supernatural acts that cannot be explained or accounted for in nature, as naturalism demands. Supernaturalism, according to Lewis is not only possible, but pervasive since the act of logical thinking itself is supernatural in origin. ~ J.F. Foster at Amazon.com
Judith Hayes on Miracles said...
In God We Trust: But Which One? (Madison, WI: FFRF, 1997), p. 154.
If a plane crashes and 99 people die while 1 survives, it is called a miracle. Should the families of the 99 think so?
R. Douglas Geivet and Gary R. Habermas, eds. (InterVarsity Press, February 1997), 330p.
Geivett and Habermas have collected some of the best available scholars around today to present a case for the actions of God in human history. The book begins with David Hume's work on miracles along with a response from Antony Flew (the eminent Humean scholar). Then, a barrage of Christian philosophers and theologians tackle the issue of miracles in each chapter. Some of the chapter titles include - "Defining Miracles" (Richard Purtill), "Miracles and the Modern Mind" (Norman L. Geisler), "History and Miracles" (Francis J. Beckwith), "Recognizing a Miracle" (Winfried Corduan), "Science, Miracles, Agency, Theory & the God-of-the-Gaps" (J.P. Moreland), "The Evidential Value of Miracles" (Douglas Geivett), "Miracles in the World Religions" (David K. Clark), "The Incarnation of Jesus Christ" (John S. Feinberg), "The Empty Tomb of Jesus" (William Lane Craig), "The Resurrection Appearances of Jesus" (Gary R. Habermas), and more.
David Basinger in Sophia: A Journal for Discussion in Philosophical Theology (Volume 26, Number 3 / October, 1987). See also, "Further Clarification".
In response to Robert A. Larmer, Basinger argues: "There is little basis upon which to claim that all proponents of solely
natural causation are guilty of dogmatic, uncritical, question-begging
reasoning. To claim emphatically that there is in fact no God (and thus
no divine causal intervention) may be an unwarranted metaphysical
contention. But the nontheist need not be making any such ontological
claim. She can simply be saying that, while this epistemological
contention is debatable, its affirmation is not necessarily any more
dogmatic or question begging than the belief that the 'total' evidence
makes theistic belief (and thus the possibility of divine intervention)
most reasonable."
David Basinger in Sophia: A Journal for Discussion in Philosophical Theology. For the preliminaries, see "Miracles and Natural Explanations".
In an ongoing dialogue in this journal (Sophia), Robert Larmer and I have been discussing whether the undisputed occurrence of certain conceivable events — for instance, astonishing healings — could require all honest, thoughtful individuals to acknowledge that God has supernaturally intervened in earthly affairs. I have not denied that a theist (or nontheist) could justifiably consider the occurrence of certain possible (or even actual) events to be strong evidence for theism — for the existence of a God who benevolently intervenes in earthly affairs. But nontheists, I have argued, can justifiably maintain that evil — that the amount and nature of human pain and suffering — stands as strong evidence against God's existence. Furthermore, I have argued, nontheists can justifiably maintain that the evidence against God's existence generated by evil would outweigh any amount of evidence for theism that might be produced by any conceivable set of events. And for this reason I have continued to deny that there exists any conceivable context in which a person who did not acknowledge that God has intervened in earthly affairs could justifiably be accused of having conducted herself in a nonrational manner.
William Lane Craig in Gospel Perspectives VI, pp. 9-40. David Wenham and Craig Blomberg, eds. (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1986).
In his survey of the history of thought with respect to miracles, Craig traces the demise of the plausability of such supernatural events amongst biblical scholars, expressed first in naturalistic explanations for biblical events and ultimately in the repudiation of the reliability of the biblical texts. Craig addresses the influence of Bahrdt, Paulus, Schleiermacher, Strauss, and Bultmann before turning to their intellectual forebears, the thinking of Spinoza and Hume and the backdrop of Newton's mechanistic universe. Craig offers a response to each of these principal thinkers in turn, concluding that "the presupposition of the impossibility of miracles should play no role in determining the historicity of an event", even an allegedly supernatural one. In so doing, he challenges the notion that natural law must preclude miracles and provides a patient response to each of the principal objections. Craig's lengthy article is a worthwhile read both for its summary history of biblical scholarship and for its recommendation for appropriate criteria in the study of history. ~ Afterall
~ by David Basinger, in Sophia: A Journal for Discussion in Philosophical Theology. (1983, vol. 22, no2, pp. 15-22)
Basinger responds to Anthony Flew's contention that: "the historian must maintain with respect to any alleged miracle that the event did not in fact occur as reported". Basinger concedes that Flew's argument has merit, but argues that it ultimately fails. And by the way, to save a trip to dictionary.com, "nomology" is the science of laws. Basinger concludes: "The fact that
an alleged occurrence is incompatible with current nomologicals must
indeed be seriously considered when the historian rules on its
historicity. However, Flew has failed to demonstrate that a seeming
counterinstance must be shown to be consistent with current
nomologicals before the historian can justifiably rule that it can be
known to have occurred. Alleged 'miracles' cannot be dismissed this
easily."
Murder on the Orient Express (1934).
The impossible could not have happened, therefore the impossible must be possible in spite of appearances. ... Exactly! It is absurd — improbable — it cannot be. So I myself have said. And yet, my friend, there it is! One cannot escape from the facts.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Sect. 10, Part 1.
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
The Writings of Thomas Paine (G.P. Putnam: 1896), p. 321-2.
The dogma of the redemption is the fable of priest-craft invented since the time the New Testament was compiled, and the agreeable delusion of it suited with the depravity of immoral livers. When men are taught to ascribe all their crimes and vices to the temptations of the Devil, and to believe that Jesus by his death rubs all off, and pays their passage to heaven gratis, they become as careless in morals as a spendthrift would be of money, were he told that his father had engaged to pay off all his scores. It is a doctrine not only dangerous to morals in this world, but to our happiness in the next world, because it holds out such a cheap, easy, and lazy way of getting to heaven, as has a tendency to induce men to hug the delusion of it to their own injury. ¶ But there are times when men have serious thoughts, and it is at such times, when they begin to think, that they begin to doubt the truth of the Christian Religion; and well they may, for it is too fanciful and too full of conjecture, inconsistency, improbability, and irrationality, to afford consolation to the thoughtful man. His reason revolts against his creed. He sees that none of its articles are proved, or can be proved. He may believe that such a person as is called Jesus (for Christ was not his name) was born and grew to be a man, because it is no more than a natural and probable case. But who is to prove he is the son of God, that he was begotten by the Holy Ghost? Of these things there can be no proof; and that which admits not of proof, and is against the laws of probability and the order of nature, which God himself has established, is not an object for belief. God has not given man reason to embarrass him, but to prevent his being imposed upon.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (LaSalle, III.: Open Court, 1966 [first published 1748]), p. 145.
[U]pon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian Religion not only
was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be
believed by any reasonable person without one.... Whoever is moved by
Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own
person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and
gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom
and experience.
Rudolf Bultmann on Miracles said...
Kerygma and Myth, (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 5.
It is impossible to use electrical light and the wireless and to avail
ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same
time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles.