What kinds of things are redness, hairiness, and humanness. We take such things for granted. And yet, there is great controversy about the ontological nature of such properties. There are three basic approaches: "Extreme Nominalism (properties do not exist), Nominalism (properties exist and are themselves particulars), and Realism (properties exist and are universals)." Moreland argues for the superior explanatory power of Realism in accounting for these realities. While this argument may seem academic, there is a lot at stake for the Naturalistic world view in at least one respect. If, in fact, non-physical properties exist, then the universe is not comprised solely of matter and energy. The door creaks open for other kinds of non-physical entities like numbers, consciousness, and perhaps even God.
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William Alston brings a philosopher's perspective to prayer, the somewhat audacious belief that humans can speak with God. Alston considers in particular the yet more remarkable belief that God responds to our petitions. A 2005 Rasmussen poll found that 47% of Americans pray daily or nearly every day, but prayer rarely benefits from this kind of philosophical reflection.
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Philosopher William Alston articulates why he returned to Christianity after discarding his Christian faith not once, but twice. Alston notes that it was not any of the classical arguments for the credibility of Christian faith that beckoned him back, but rather something more intangible: "My coming back was less like seeing that certain premises implied a
conclusion than it was like coming to hear some things in music that I
hadn't heard before, or having my eyes opened to the significance of
things that are going on around me." Alston goes on to say that what has kept him faithful ten years on is a real sense that God remains active in his life... that his faith "is working; the promise is being fulfilled". For what it's worth, here's one man's testimony. ~ Afterall
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Alston notes two pillars that he believes, in tandem, support theistic belief: the general consideration of natural theology and the experience of God. For Alston, the latter bears the greater weight and he goes on to explore how such experience contributes appropriate epistemic support to theism.
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[Introduction] Why believe that there is a God at all? My answer is that to suppose
that there is a God explains why there is a world at all; why there are
the scientific laws there are; why animals and then human beings have
evolved; why humans have the opportunity to mould their characters and
those of their fellow humans for good or ill and to change the
environment in which we live; why we have the well-authenticated account
of Christ's life, death and resurrection; why throughout the centuries
men have had the apparent experience of being in touch with and guided
by God; and so much else. In fact, the hypothesis of the existence of
God makes sense of the whole of our experience, and it does so better
than any other explanation which can be put forward, and that is the
grounds for believing it to be true. This paper seeks to justify this
answer; it presents in summary arguments given in more detailed form in
my book The Existence of God,[1] and seeks to rebut criticisms
of those arguments given in J.L. Mackie's book The Miracle of
Theism.[2]
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In this paper, I ponder two questions: (1) Why can't the religious believer simply put the burden on
the skeptic, and ask him to justify his unbelief, with the
underlying assumption that as between theism and atheism, it
is the former that is obviously true and the latter that is
obviously false? (2) This not being possible in any way that
is of immediate interest to religious belief, how does the
believer regard his inability to prove the truth of faith in
the manner the skeptic demands? >
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I've been arguing that theistic belief does not (in general) need argument either for deontological justification, or for positive epistemic status, (or for Foley rationality or Alstonian justification)); belief in God is properly basic. But doesn't follow, of course that there aren't any good arguments. Are there some? At least a couple of dozen or so. >
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Theists frequently argue that nontheists must affirm the following:
(1) If there is no God, each person must define "good" and "evil"
for herself. (2) If each person must define "good" and "evil"
for herself, there can be no objective moral standard. (3) God
does not exist. (4) Therefore there can be no objective moral
standard (i.e., all moral principles are relative). Some nontheists agree (e.g., Sartre) and attempt to live with
the implications of (4). Others deny (2), claiming that the existence
of an objective moral standard is not dependent on religious commitment.
Kai Nielsen is one of the best known and most outspoken members
of this group. Nielsen argued that "the nonexistence of God does
not preclude the possibility of there being an objective standard
on which to base [moral] judgments." He has recently reaffirmed
this claim:
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Current discussions of the 'problem of evil' vary greatly in at
least two ways. First, those involved in such discussions often
differ on the exact nature of the problem. Some see it as primarily
logical (deductive), some as primarily evidential (inductive),
and still others as primarily psychological (personal, pastoral).
Second, those involved in such discussions differ radically on
what is required of the theist in response. Some claim that unless
the theist can offer an explanation for evil (a theodicy) that
is satisfying to rational individuals in general, theistic belief
is rendered unjustified. Others agree that the theist must offer
a theodicy, but deny that such an explanation must be found convincing by most if theistic belief is to remain justified. And still others deny that the theist is required to offer any sort of explanation
(theodicy), arguing instead that the theist need only defend the
logical consistency of simultaneous belief in the existence of
evil and God. >
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Paul Vitz, a professor of psychology at NYU, proposes a provocative thesis: atheistic inclinations or commitments are often rooted in the so-called "freudian psyche", that subconscious sum of our memories, fears, impressions, and deep seated dispositions formed early in our lives, particularly in relation to our fathers. While psychological grounds for belief are usually used to undercut the rationality of theism, here Vitz runs the argument the other way in a fascinating summary of psychological factors tied to atheistic belief. And by way of example, he considers the possible psychological motivations of the father of psychoanalysis, Freud himself. Turns out atheists have daddy issues as well. Vitz's argument here was a prelude to his later work, Faith of the Fatherless: The Psychology of Atheism.
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Among other things, scientists try to solve both empirical and conceptual problems. Conceptual problems, in turn, are of two basic types: internal and external. In this article, I offer a taxonomy of both types of conceptual problems that have constituted scientific practice throughout its history and argue that certain activities done by creationists fit this taxonomy nicely. I then conclude that these creationist activities cannot be faulted as being non-science or pseudo-science once we see how they fit a proper scientific pattern of addressing conceptual problems in other areas.
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The kalam cosmological argument, by showing that the universe
began to exist, demonstrates that the world is not a necessary being
and, therefore, not self-explanatory with respect to its existence.
Two philosophical arguments and two scientific confirmations are
presented in support of the beginning of the universe. Since whatever
begins to exist has a cause, there must exist a transcendent cause of
the universe. >
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(8206 words)
