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Ethical Systems or Sin, Evil, Inhumanity
John Rawls with Thomas Nagel, Joshua Cohen, and Robert Merrihew Adams (Harvard: Mar 31, 2009), 288 pages.
John Rawls never published anything about his own religious beliefs, but after his death two texts were discovered which shed extraordinary light on the subject. A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith is Rawls’s undergraduate senior thesis, submitted in December 1942, just before he entered the army. At that time Rawls was deeply religious; the thesis is a significant work of theological ethics, of interest both in itself and because of its relation to his mature writings. “On My Religion,” a short statement drafted in 1997, describes the history of his religious beliefs and attitudes toward religion, including his abandonment of orthodoxy during World War II. The present volume includes these two texts, together with an Introduction by Joshua Cohen and Thomas Nagel, which discusses their relation to Rawls’s published work, and an essay by Robert Merrihew Adams, which places the thesis in its theological context. The texts display the profound engagement with religion that forms the background of Rawls’s later views on the importance of separating religion and politics. Moreover, the moral and social convictions that the thesis expresses in religious form are related in illuminating ways to the central ideas of Rawls’s later writings. His notions of sin, faith, and community are simultaneously moral and theological, and prefigure the moral outlook found in Theory of Justice. ~ Product Description
Peter Kreeft (Ignatius Press: October 1, 1999)
The only boring aspect of this book is its title, which doesn't do
justice to apologist Kreeft's intelligent, engaging dialogue between
two fictional friends during a week of relaxation at Martha's Vineyard.
Kreeft, philosophy professor at Boston College and author of more than
25 books, describes the absolutist character 'Isa as a Muslim
fundamentalist from Palestine who teaches philosophy at the American
University in Beirut. His interviewer and sparring partner is Libby
Rawls, an African-American, liberal feminist journalist. Using a
classic debate format, with impressive fairness to the opposite side,
Kreeft defines relativism and its importance. Tracing relativism's
evolution and history in Western philosophy, Kreeft notes that
relativism is a fairly modern perspective, originating within the last
few hundred years. He outlines the philosophical distinctions between
it and absolutism with clarity and an integrity that will delight both
the layperson and the professional philosopher. For Kreeft, relativism
has eroded a collective and individual sense of accountability and
contributed to social decay, yet he can see the other side, especially
with regard to cross-cultural differences. Although the purpose of the
book is to uphold absolutism, Kreeft outlines the relativist
perspective in an approachable, respectful manner. By giving
counterarguments a fighting chance, this becomes a book that may
actually persuade people, not just preach to the absolutist choir. ~ Publishers Weekly
Craig A. Boyd (Brazos Press: November 2007), 272 pages.
Boyd presents an insightful account of natural law ethics, the view that ethical principles derive from the requirements of human nature. A prime obstacle to the acceptance of this type of ethics is that it transgresses the fact-value dichotomy. Boyd responds in detail to this objection, as well as to G.E. Moore's criticism of ethical naturalism. Although he defends natural law, Boyd holds that the classical version of that view as advanced by Thomas Aquinas cannot be accepted. It is based, he writes, on outdated biology, and attention to modern evolutionary theory results in a natural law position less universalistic in its claims than the classical doctrine. Boyd further criticizes other attempts to use evolutionary biology in ethics, as expressed in Larry Arnhart's Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature and the writings of E.O. Wilson. Natural law, Boyd argues, needs to be supplemented with virtue ethics. He also compares natural law to divine command ethics and addresses postmodernist and relativist criticisms. Boyd discusses an unusually wide range of material, and his challenging book is recommended for philosophy collections. ~ Product Description
The Plague (New York: Vintage International, 1948, 1975), 37.
When a war breaks out, people say: "It's too stupid; it can't last
long." But though a war may well be "too stupid," that doesn't prevent
its lasting. Stupidity has a knack of getting its way; as we should see
if we were not always so much wrapped in ourselves... In this
respect our townspeople were like everybody else, wrapped up in
themselves; in other words they were humanists: they disbelieved in
pestilences. A pestilence isn't a thing made to man's measure;
therefore we tell ourselves that pestilence is a mere bogy of the mind,
a bad dream that will pass away. But it doesn't always pass away and,
from one bad dream to another, it is men who pass away. Our townsfolk
were not more to blame than others; they forgot to be modest, that was
all, and thought that everything still was possible for them.
Albert Camus on Suffering said...
The Plague, (New York: Vintage International, 1948, 1975) 224.
His interest quickened when, in a more emphatic tone, the preacher said
that there were some things we could grasp as touching God, and others
we could not. There was not doubt as to the existence of good and evil
and, as a rule, it was easy to see the difference between them. The
difficulty began when we looked into the nature of evil, and among
things evil he included human suffering. Thus we had apparently needful
pain, and apparently needless pain; we had right that a libertine
should be struck down, we see no reason for a child's suffering. And,
truth to tell, nothing was more important on earth than a child's
suffering, the horror it inspires in us, and the reason we must find to
account for it. [H]e might easily have assured them that the child's
sufferings would be compensated for by an eternity of bliss awaiting
him. But how could he give that assurance when, to tell the truth, he
knew nothing about it? For who would dare to assert that eternal
happiness can compensate for a single moment's human suffering? He who
asserted that would not be a true Christian, a follower of the Master
who knew all the pangs of suffering in his body and his soul. No, he,
Father Paneloux, would keep faith with that great symbol of all
suffering, the tortured body on the Cross; he would stand fast, his
back to the wall and face honestly the terrible problem of a child's
agony. And he would boldly say to those who listened to his words
today, "My brother, a time of testing has come for us all. We must
believe everything or deny everything. And who among you, I ask, would
dare to deny everything?"
"Epistle II" in An Essay On Man (T. Tegg: 1811), pp. 61-2.
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan, ¶ The proper study of mankind is Man. ¶ Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state, ¶ A being darkly wise, and rudely great: ¶ With too much knowledge for the sceptic side, ¶ With too much weakness for the stoic's pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest; ¶ In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast; ¶ In doubt his mind or body to prefer; ¶ Born but to die; and reas'ning but to err: ¶ Alike in ignorance, his reason such, ¶ Whether he thinks too little or too much; ¶ Chaos of thought and passion, all confus'd; ¶ Still by himself abus'd or disabus'd; ¶ Created half to rise and half to fall; ¶ Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all; ¶ Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd; ¶ The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest; ¶ In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast; ¶ In doubt his mind or body to prefer; ¶ Born but to die; and reas'ning but to err: ¶ Alike in ignorance, his reason such, ¶ Whether he thinks too little or too much; ¶ Chaos of thought and passion, all confus'd; ¶ Still by himself abus'd or disabus'd; ¶ Created half to rise and half to fall; ¶ Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all; ¶ Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd; ¶ The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!
Mark C. Murphy (Cornell University Press: August 2002), 224 pages.
In the first book wholly concerned with divine authority, Mark C. Murphy explores the extent of God's rule over created rational beings. The author challenges the view-widely supported by theists and nontheists alike-that if God exists, then humans must be bound by an obligation of obedience to this being. He demonstrates that this view, the "authority thesis," cannot be sustained by any of the arguments routinely advanced on its behalf, including those drawn from perfect being theology, metaethical theory, normative principles, and even Scripture and tradition. After exposing the inadequacies of the various arguments for the authority thesis, he develops his own solution to the problem of whether, and to what extent, God is authoritative. For Murphy, divine authority is a contingent matter: while created rational beings have decisive reason to subject themselves to the divine rule, they are under divine authority only insofar as they have chosen to allow God's decisions to take the place of their own in their practical reasoning. The author formulates and defends his arguments for this view, and notes its implications for understanding the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. ~ Product Description
Alexander Miller (Wiley, John & Sons: June 2003), 328 pages.
An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics provides a highly readable critical overview of the main arguments and themes in twentieth-century and contemporary metaethics. It traces the development of contemporary debates in metaethics from their beginnings in the work of G. E. Moore up to the most recent arguments between naturalism and non-naturalism, cognitivism and non-cognitivism. • A highly readable critical overview of the main arguments and themes in twentieth century and contemporary metaethics. • Asks: Are there moral facts? Is there such a thing as moral truth? Is moral knowledge possible? • Traces the development of contemporary debates in metaethics from their beginnings in the work of G. E. Moore up to the most recent debates between naturalism and non-naturalism, cognitivism and noncognitivism. • Provides for the first time a critical survey of famous figures in twentieth century metaethics such as Moore, Ayer and Mackie together with in-depth discussions of contemporary philosophers such as Blackburn, Gibbard, Wright, Harman, Railton, Sturgeon, McDowell and Wiggins. ~ Product Description
Cur Deus Homo ("Why God Became Man") (1033-1109).
When it is said that what God wishes is just, and that what He does not
wish is unjust, we must not understand that if God wished anything
improper it would be just, simply because he wished it. For if God
wishes to lie, we must not conclude that it is right to lie, but rather
that he is not God. For no will can ever wish to lie, unless truth in
it is impaired, nay, unless the will itself be impaired by forsaking
truth. When, then, it is said: "If God wishes to lie," the meaning is
simply this: "If the nature of God is such as that he wishes to lie;"
and, therefore, it does not follow that falsehood is right, except it
be understood in the same manner as when we speak of two impossible
things: "If this be true, then that follows; because neither this nor
that is true;" as if a man should say: "Supposing water to be dry, and
fire to be moist;" for neither is the case. Therefore, with regard to
these things, to speak the whole truth: If God desires a thing, it is
right that he should desire that which involves no unfitness. For if
God chooses that it should rain, it is right that it should rain; and
if he desires that any man should die, then is it right that he should
die. Wherefore, if it be not fitting for God to do anything unjustly,
or out of course, it does not belong to his liberty or compassion or
will to let the sinner go unpunished who makes no return to God of what
the sinner has
Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin, eds. (Routledge: July 2006), 621 pages.
Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don’t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume discusses a wide range of issues including moral objectivity, truth and moral judgements, moral psychology, thick evaluative concepts and moral relativism. The editors provide lucid introductions to each of the eleven themed sections in which they show how the debate lies and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing about Metaethics is an ideal resource text for students at upper undergraduate or postgraduate level.
Michael Martin (Prometheus: Oct, 2002), 330 pages.
Despite the pluralism of contemporary American culture, the Judaeo-Christian legacy still has a great deal of influence on the popular imagination. Thus it is not surprising that in this context atheism has a slightly scandalous ring, and unbelief is often associated with the lack of morality and a meaningless existence. Distinguished philosopher and committed atheist Michael Martin sets out to refute such notions in this thorough defense of atheism as both a moral and a meaningful philosophy of life. Martin shows not only that objective morality and a purposeful life are possible without belief in God but also that the predominantly Christian worldview of American society is seriously flawed as the basis of morality and meaning. ~ Product Description
Barry Goldwater on Human Nature said...
With No Apologies: Personal and Political Memoirs (Morrow : 1979), 320 pages.
We have conjured up all manner of devils responsible for our present
discontent. It is the unchecked bureaucracy in government, it is the
selfishness of multinational corporate giants, it is the failure of the
schools to teach and the students to learn, it is overpopulation, it is
wasteful extravagance, it is squandering our national resources, it is
racism, it is capitalism, it is our material affluence, or if we want a
convenient foreign devil, we can say it is communism. But when we
scrape away the varnish of wealth, education, class, ethnic origin,
parochial loyalties, we discover that however much we've changed the
shape of man's physical environment, man himself is still sinful,
vain, greedy, ambitious, lustful, self-centered, unrepentant, and
requiring of restraint.
"Do We Survive Death?" in Why I Am Not a Christian (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1957), 88-93.
[I]t is only when we think abstractly that we have such a high opinion
of man. Of men in the concrete, most of us think the vast majority very
bad. Civilized states spend more that half their revenue on killing
each other's citizens. Consider the long history of the activities
inspired by moral fervor: human sacrifices, persecution of heretics,
witch-hunts, pogroms leading up to wholesale extermination by poison
gases... Are these abominations, and the ethical doctrines by which
they are prompted, really evidence of an intelligent Creator? And can
we really wish that the men who practiced them should live forever? The
world in which we live can be understood as a result of muddle and
accident; but if it is the outcome of deliberate purpose, the purpose
must have been that of a fiend. For my part, I find accident a less
painful and more plausible hypothesis.
The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1872-1914, (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), pp. 3-4.
Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my
life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable
pity for the suffering of mankind. These passions, like great winds,
have blown me hither and thither, in a wayward course, over a deep
ocean of anguish, reaching to the very verge of despair... Love
and knowledge, so far as they were possible, led upward toward the
heavens. But always pity brought me back to earth. Echoes of cries of
pain reverberate in my heart. Children in famine, victims tortured by
oppressors, helpless old people a hated burden to their sons, and the
whole world of loneliness, poverty, and pain make a mockery of what
human life should be. I long to alleviate the evil, but I cannot, and I
too suffer.
Bertrand Russell on Placebos said...
"A Debate on the Existence of God" (1948) in Bertrand Russell on God and Religion (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986), p. 136.
The fact that a belief has a good moral effect upon a man is no evidence whatsoever in favor of its truth.
"Why I Am Not a Christian" in Bertrand Russell on God and Religion (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986), p. 62.
Do you think that, if you were granted omnipotence and omniscience and
millions of years in which to perfect your world, you could produce
nothing better than the Ku Klux Klan, the Fascist, and Mr. Winston
Churchill? Really I am not much impressed with the people who say:
"Look at me: I am such a splendid product that there must have been
design in the universe." I am not very impressed by the splendor of
those people. Therefore I think that this argument of design is really
a very poor argument indeed. Moreover, if you accept the ordinary laws
of science, you have to suppose that human life and life in general on
this planet will die out in due course: it is merely a flash in the
pan; it is a stage in the decay of the solar system; at a certain stage
of decay you get the sort of conditions of temperature and so forth
which are suitable to protoplasm, and there is life for a short time in
the life of the whole solar system. You see in the moon the sort of
thing to which the earth is tending — something dead, cold, and
lifeless.
The LA Times (December 1, 1999).
After years spent studying the world's great philosophers and writers,
of poring over the Bible, Talmud, Torah and other ancient texts, of
discussions with inspired social and religious leaders, [Eli] Wiesel
still has no answer to the question of what makes people good or evil.
"I can give all the usual answers — education, home, parents, peer
pressure. But these are just factors. The mystery of why people become
good or evil is still just that — a mystery." But he has thought of one
"rational approach" to ensuring more goodness in humanity. It is
respect. "If I respect The Other for whatever The Other is, and The
Other respects me for whatever I am, then there can be understanding
and even great friendship between all people."
The Ragamuffin Gospel (Questar Publishers, 1993), 21.
The Good News means we can stop lying to ourselves. The sweet sound of
amazing grace saves us from the necessity of self-deception. It keeps
us from denying that though Christ was victorious, the battle with
lust, greed, and pride still rages within us. As a sinner who has been
redeemed, I can acknowledge that I am often unloving, irritable, angry,
and resentful with those closest to me. When I go to church I can leave
my white hat at home and admit I have failed. God not only loves me as
I am, but also knows me as I am. Because of this I don't need to
apply spiritual cosmetics to make myself presentable to him. I can
accept ownership of my poverty and powerlessness and neediness.
Reflections on the Psalms (Harvest Books, 1964), p.146-7.
It seems that there is a general rule in the moral universe which may
be formulated "The higher, the more in danger". The "average sensual
man" who is sometimes unfaithful to his wife, sometimes tipsy, always a
little selfish, now and then (within the law) a trip sharp in his
deals, is certainly, by ordinary standards, a "lower" type than the man
whose soul is filled with some great Cause, to which he will
subordinate his appetites, his fortune, and even his safety. But it is
out of the second man that something really fiendish can be made; an
Inquisitor. "It is great men, potential saints, not little men, who
become those who are readiest to kill for it". For the supernatural,
entering a human soul, opens to it new possibilities both of good and
evil. From that point the road branches: one way to sanctity, love,
humility, the other to spiritual pride, self-righteousness, persecuting
zeal. And no way back to the mere humdrum virtues and vices of the
unawakened soul. If the Divine call does not make us better, it will
make us very much worse. Of all bad men religious bad men are the
worst.
Surprised by Joy (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: 1955), 171.
[T]here was one way in which the world, as ... rationalism taught me to
see it, gratified my wishes. It might be grim and deadly but at least
it was free from the Christian God. Some people (not all) will find it
hard to understand why this seemed to me such an overwhelming
advantage... I was, as you may remember, one whose negative demands
were more violent than his positive, far more eager to escape pain than
to achieve happiness, and feeling it something of an outrage that I had
been created without my own permission. To such a craven the
materialist's universe had the enormous attraction that it offered you
limited liabilities. No strictly infinite disaster could overtake you
in it. Death ended all. And if ever finite disaster proved greater than
one wished to bear suicide would always be possible. The horror of the
Christian universe was that it had no door marked Exit.
