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Reason & Logic
Thomas Nagel (B.A., Cornell; B.Phil., Oxford; Ph.D., Harvard; D.Litt
(hon.), Oxford), University Professor, Professor of Law, Professor of
Philosophy. He specializes in Political Philosophy, Ethics,
Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind. He is a Fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Corresponding Fellow of the British
Academy, and a Member of the American Philosophical Society, and has
received a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award in the Humanities, the
Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, and the Balzan Prize in Moral
Philosophy.
He is the author of The
Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, 1970, reprinted Princeton, 1978),
Mortal Questions (Cambridge, 1979), The
View From Nowhere (Oxford, 1986), What
Does It All Mean? (Oxford, 1987), Equality
and Partiality (Oxford, 1991), Other
Minds (Oxford, 1995), The Last
Word (Oxford, 1997),
The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (with Liam Murphy) (Oxford, 2002), and Concealment and Exposure (Oxford, 2002).
Thomas Nagel on Explanations said...
"Dawkins and Atheism" in Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (Oxford University Press: 2009), pp. 22-3.
The reason we are led to the hypothesis of a designer by considering both the watch and the eye is that these are complex physical structures that carry out a complex function, and we cannot see how they could have come into existence out of unorganized matter purely on the basis of the purposeless laws of physics. For the elements of which they are composed to have come together in just this finely tuned way purely as a result of physical and chemical laws would have been such an improbable fluke that we can regard it in effect as impossible: The hypothesis of chance can be ruled out. But God, whatever he may be, is not a complex physical inhabitant of the natural world. The explanation of his existence as a chance concatenation of atoms is not a possibility to which we must find an alternative, because that is not what anybody means by God. If the God hypothesis makes sense at all, it offers a different kind of explanation from those of physical science: explanation by the purpose or intention of a mind without a body, capable nevertheless of creating and forming the entire physical world. The point of the hypothesis is to claim that not all explanation is physical, and that there is a mental, purposive, or intentional explanation more fundamental even than the basic laws of physics, because it explains even them.
C.S. Lewis on Opaque Explanation said...
The Abolition of Man (1943), chp. 3.
There are
progressions in which the last step is sui
generis — incommensurable with the others — and in which
to go the whole way is to undo all the labour of your previous
journey. ... Up to that point, the kind of explanation which explains
things away may give us something, though at a heavy cost. But you
cannot go on 'explaining away' for ever: you will find that you have
explained explanation itself away. You cannot go on 'seeing
through'
things for ever. The whole point of seeing through
something is to see something through it. It is good that the window
should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is
opaque. How if you saw through the garden too? It is no use trying to
'see through' first principles. If you see through everything, then
everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an
invisible world. To 'see through' all things is the same as not to
see.
A Clarification in Response to Luke Muehlhauser's "Who Designed the Designer?"
Luke, the wunderkind over at Common Sense Atheism, continues to be a tremendously salutary voice in the online conversation about God. Recently, Luke set out to kill a sacred cow, "one of atheism's most popular and resilient retorts", namely: "Who designed the designer?". This, he argues, simply is not a defeater to theistic arguments. I should add, what he offers with one hand, he takes with the other. "The problem with offering 'God did it' as an explanation is that such an explanation has low plausibility, is not testable, has poor consistency with background knowledge, comes from a tradition (supernaturalism) with extreme explanatory failure, lacks simplicity, offers no predictive novelty, and has poor explanatory scope." But returning to the more common objection, Luke points out 1) that we accept unexplained explanations in science, and 2) that if every explanation must be explained to count as an explanation, we end in an infinite regress and nothing is ever explained. It is the nature of the case that some explanations must be ultimate explanations. Both of Luke's points are well taken, and echo the responses offered by William Lane Craig and other theists to this common rejoinder. However, throughout, Luke characterizes the supposed conclusions to the natural theologian's premises as simply: "God did it". Luke undoubtedly knows that this is an oversimplification of such arguments when they are carefully articulated, that much like postulates in physics, their conclusions are of the form: some entity x exists with property p. We'll give it the name y. I do not mean to nitpick, and I understand the use of shorthand, but this distinction is critical in evaluating the appropriateness of a given explanation, the very subject matter of the post. My attempt at a constructive response follows.
"The Argument from Reason" in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, eds. (Wiley-Blackwell: 2009), pp. 379-80.
It is not enough that one mental event cause another mental event in virtue of its propositional content. Someone who engages in rational inference must recognize the correctness of the principle of sound reasoning, which one applies to one's inference. Modus Ponens works, affirming the consequent does not. Our inferences are supposed to be governed by the rules of reasoning we recognize to be correct. However, can these rules of inference ever really govern our reasoning process? According to physicalism, all of our reasoning processes are the inevitable result of a physical substrate that is not governed by reasons. ¶ So we might ask this question: "Which laws govern the activity we call rational inference?" We might stipulate, for the purposes of this discussion, the idea that laws of physics are accounts of the powers and liabilities of the objects in question. If the materialist claims that laws other than the laws of physics apply to the assemblage of particles we call human beings, then those particles are not what (mechanistic) physics says they are, and we have admitted a fundamental explanatory dualism. If however, the laws are the laws of physics, then there are no powers and liabilities that cannot be predicted from the physical level. If this is so there can be a sort of emergence, in that the basic laws governing a sleeping pill will not mention that the pills tend to put you to sleep. Nevertheless, the pill's soporific effectiveness can be fully and completely analyzed in terms of its physical powers and liability. If this is so, then we will be rational if and only if the physical configurations of matter guarantee that we are physical, and in the last analysis, the laws of logic do not govern our intellectual conduct.
Richard Carrier on Logical Laws said...
"Critical Review of Victor Reppert's Defense of the Argument from Reason" at infidels.org (2004).
For logical laws are just like physical laws, because physical laws describe the way the universe works, and logical laws describe the way reason works — or, to avoid begging the question, logical laws describe the way a truth-finding machine works, in the very same way that the laws of aerodynamics describe the way a flying-machine works, or the laws of ballistics describe the way guns shoot their targets. The only difference between logical laws and physical laws is the fact that physical laws describe physics and logical laws describe logic. But that is a difference both trivial and obvious.
Metaphysics: Constructing a World View (Intervarsity: 1983), p. 49.
Computers function as they do because they have been constructed by human beings endowed with rational insight. And the results of their computations are accepted because they are evaluated by rational human beings as conforming to rational norms. A computer, in other words, is merely an extension of the rationality of its designers and users, it is no more an independent source of rational insight than a television set is an independent source of news and entertainment.
Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind (1788), Chapter III.
There
is such proneness in men of genius to invent hypotheses, and in others
to acquiesce in them as the utmost which the human faculties can attain
in philosophy, that it is of the last consequence to the progress of
real knowledge, that men should have a clear and distinct understanding
of the nature of hypotheses in philosophy, and of the regard that is
due to them. ¶
Although some conjectures may have a considerable
degree of probability, yet it is evidently in the nature of conjecture
to be uncertain. In every case, the assent ought to be proportioned to
the evidence; for to believe firmly what has but a small degree of
probability, is a manifest abuse of our understanding. Now, though we
may, in many cases, form very probable conjectures concerning the works
of men, every conjecture we can form with regard to the works of God
has as little probability as the conjectures of a child with regard to
the works of a man.
In its own words:
"While run-on sentences, comma splices, split infinitives, and other
such grammatical minutiae may rarely make appearances in the best of
our nation’s dailies and weeklies, and a small but growing class of
press watchdogs help to correct errors of fact (pointing out bias,
factual omissions, and distortions), a more perilous corruption lurks
under the clean surface of the printed page: specious reasoning." ... "Our contemporary political discourse is, to put it
bluntly, a mess. As a population we simply are not trained in the basic
logical, rhetorical, and analytic tools necessary to navigate the swamp
of contemporary politics." ... "Logical analysis should be a first line of defense
against the hijacking of our political discourse by cynical
manipulators. Even without knowing the truth of the premises of an
argument, one can determine whether or not the conclusion is justified
by these premises. Sadly, as we will have ample opportunity to show in
detail, many editorialists cannot even pass such a basic and
fundamental test. This transforms their editorials from opinions that
are worth taking seriously into mere nonsense and empty assertions. As we say, we are speaking 'validity to power' — not truth as the phrase usually runs, but validity."
Jordan Howard Sobel (Cambridge University Press: Apr 9, 2009), 676 pages.
Filled with new, interesting, and insightful observations and analyses ... a book everyone interested in philosophy of religion will want - and need — to read." ~ Graham Oppy, Monash University • "I'm often asked to recommend books on philosophy of religion from a skeptical point of view, and Mackie's The Miracle of Theism has been the only thing I could wholeheartedly endorse. Sobel's book would give me a second option. It's the best thing of its kind since Mackie's book, and in many respects, it's better than The Miracle of Theism." ~ Robert C. Koons, University of Texas, Austin • "This book is a rich resource for those interested in the traditional arguments for and against belief in God's existence ... the book is valuable not so much for the author's own conclusions in each chapter, as it is for the rich resource it constitutes ... the author has done a great service by assembling different versions of arguments for and against God's existence, by discussing the arguments intelligently and critically ... I suspect that many philosophers of religion, both theists and sceptics, will be responding to the particular arguments of this book for some time to come." ~ Ars Disputandi
"The Dawkins Confusion" at ChristianityToday.com (March 1, 2007).
Since we have been cobbled together by (unguided)
evolution, it is unlikely, he thinks, that our view of the world is
overall accurate; natural selection is interested in adaptive behavior,
not in true belief. But Dawkins fails to plumb the real depths of the
skeptical implications of the view that we have come to be by way of
unguided evolution. We can see this as follows. Like most naturalists,
Dawkins is a materialist about human beings: human persons are material
objects; they are not immaterial selves or souls or substances joined
to a body, and they don't contain any immaterial substance as a part.
From this point of view, our beliefs would be dependent on
neurophysiology, and (no doubt) a belief would just be a neurological
structure of some complex kind. Now the neurophysiology on which our
beliefs depend will doubtless be adaptive; but why think for a moment
that the beliefs dependent on or caused by that neurophysiology will be
mostly true? Why think our cognitive faculties are reliable?
Arguing About Gods (Cambridge: Sep. 4, 2006), pp. 5, 6.
If we have two valid arguments, each of which entails the conclusion that a particular monotheistic god exists, then we can form a disjunctive argument that also entails the same conclusion. More generally, if we have a large collection of valid arguments, each of which entails the conclusion that a particular monotheistic god exists, then we can form a multiply disjunctive argument that also entails that same conclusion. However, it should not be supposed that a 'cumulative' argument that is formed in this way is guaranteed to be a better argument than the individual arguments with which we began (even if we are properly entitled to the claim that the arguments with which we are working are all valid). For, on the one hand, if all of the arguments are defective on grounds other than those of validity — for example, because they have false premises, or because they are question-begging — then the cumulative argument will also be defective. But, on the other hand, if even one of the arguments with which we began is not defective on any other grounds, then it is a cogent argument for its conclusion, and the cumulative argument is plainly worse (since longer and more convoluted). So, at the very least, we have good reason to be suspicious of talk about a cumulative case for the claim that a given monotheistic god does — or does not — exist that is based upon a collection of (allegedly) valid arguments for the claim that the god in question does — or does not — exist. ...
Thomas Nagel on Rationalization said...
The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 130.
The ordinary charge of "rationalization," like the exposure of errors in reasoning, does not question the claims of reason itself but rather presupposes them. It contrasts the sources of belief in this case with an alternative type of ground that would actually justify them, or demonstrate their truth.
Reasoning Practically (Oxford University Press: 2000), p. 76.
Given my focus on practical rather than theoretical reasoning, I may at this point consider weakening the principle of total evidence and examining a presumption instead. The presumption to be examined establishes, for purposes of rational action, a generic bias in favor of more knowledge rather than on less. To defend the adoption of the presumption in favor of being maximally informed amounts to defending the belief that following it will lead, in the long run, to better overall results, in terms of goal fulfillment, than the results of following its antithesis (i.e., a presumption establishing a generic bias in favor of acting on the basis of less knowledge rather than on more), or indeed better than the results of a case-by-case balancing (i.e., of following no rule or presumption at all).
Clipped by Nathan Jacobson
Jeffrey Jay Lowder, founder of the Internet Infidels, offers a welcome clarification of the term 'feethinker,' in his article, "Is 'Freethinker' Synonymous with 'Nontheist?'" He ultimately agrees with Bertrand Russell that what defines a freethinker is not the content of his beliefs, but because "after careful thought, he finds a balance of evidence in their favor." In principle, then, Lowder concedes that a theist could be a freethinker. His unremarkable conclusion is noteworthy because it demurs from the pervasive opinion of many skeptics that the defining characteristic of religious people is their unthinking credulity. Consider, by way of contrast, the Freedom from Religion Foundation's 'nontract' (sic), "What Is A Freethinker?" Still, Lowder rejects the possibility that an Evangelical Christian could be a freethinker. Considering Lowder's familiarity with the recent flowering of excellent Christian scholarship, especially in philosophy, his denial of Christian "free thinking" is, in the end, a bit puzzling.
Thomas Nagel on Reason said...
The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 3-4.
Reason, if there is such a thing, can serve as a court of appeal not only against the received opinions and habits of our community but also against the peculiarities of our personal perspective. It is something each individual can find with himself, but at the same time it has universal authority. Reason provides, mysteriously, a way of distancing oneself from common opinion and received practices that is not a mere elevation of individuality... not a determination to express one's idiosyncratic self rather than go along with everyone else. Whoever appeals to reason purports to discover a source of authority within himself that is not merely personal or societal, but universal... and that should also persuade others who are willing to listen to it.
Thomas Nagel on Rationalization said...
The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 8.
The ordinary charge of "rationalization," like the exposure of errors
in reasoning, does not question the claims of reason itself but rather
presupposes them. It contrasts the sources of belief in this case with
an alternative type of ground that would actually justify them, or
demonstrate their truth.
The Quotable Bertrand Russell (ed. Lee Eisler, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1993), p. 253.
We must therefore ask ourselves: What sort of thing is it reasonable to believe without proof? I should reply: The facts of sense experience and the principles of mathematics and logic — including the inductive logic employed in science."
Communication and Reference (Walter de Gruyter: 1984), p. 95.
Fallacies seem to resist an illuminating and perspicuous categorization and characterization. There is a quite banal consideration that makes the search for an adequate taxonomy seem doomed to failure. While there are a few principles of correct reasoning, the number of incorrect patterns of reasoning are unlimited. In other words, there is no underestimating the ability of human beings to invent new ways of making mistakes. The seems to be the view of H.W.B Joseph, who is quoted as saying, "Truth may have its norms, but error is infinite in its aberrations and they cannot be digested in any classification".
The Problem of Logic (A. and C. Black: 1908), p. 1.
Logic is the mind's systematic attempt to understand the nature and the conditions of the search after Truth. To the question, 'What is Truth?' we would answer by suggesting the following provisional definition: Truth is the Unity of ideas as systematically organized through the control exercised by relevant fact. Or: Truth is the Unity of Thought as systematically organized through the control exercised by that aspect of Reality which is relevant to the purpose of the thinker. With a view to bringing out the meaning of these definitions, we must state in the first place that we do not regard Truth as a datum, but as a problem. The truth we seek cannot be that from which we start, for were truth already attained at the outset, no sufficient reason could be assigned for proceeding any further with the quest. We might, of course, regard the Truth as given, and devote our energies to its systematic exposition and application. But, in that case, we should have radically to alter our definition of Logic. Logic would no longer deal with the Search after Truth, but would be busied solely with the question of its consistent presentation. Logic would just mean Consistency-Logic, and might be defined as the mind's systematic attempt to understand the nature and the conditions of a correct presentation of the Truth. But, valuable as such a Consistency-Logic would be, its logical value would be, not in its relation to a system of given truth, but in its analysis and development of the laws of consistent thinking.