Table of Contents

    • General Introduction by Fisher and Kirchin
  • 1. The Open Question Argument
    • G. E. Moore "The Open Question Argument", from Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903; revised ed. 1993) pp. 57-73.
    • William Frankena "The Naturalistic Fallacy" Mind 48 (1939) 464-477.
  • 2. Error Theory and Moral Realism
    • John Mackie "The Arguments from Relativity and Queerness", from Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), pp. 36-42.
    • David Brink "Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness", Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 62, no. 2. (1984), pp. 112-125.
    • Richard T. Garner "On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Facts", Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 68, no. 2 (1990), pp. 137-146.
  • 3. Moral Realism after Moore: Naturalism
    • Nicholas Sturgeon "Moral Explanations", in Morality, Reason and Truth (eds.) David Copp and David Zimmerman (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), pp. 49-78.
    • Peter Railton "Moral Realism" Philosophical Review vol. 95 (1986), pp. 163-207.
    • Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons "Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The Open Question Argument Revived" Philosophical Papers vol. 21 (1992), pp. 153-175
    • Connie Rosati "Naturalism, Normativity and the Open Question Argument" Nous vol. 29 (1995), pp. 46-70.
  • 4. Moral Realism after Moore: Non-naturalism
    • John McDowell "Values and Secondary Qualities" in Morality and Objectivity (ed.) Ted Honderich (London: Routledge, 1985), pp. 110-129.
    • Elijah Millgram "Moral Values and Secondary Qualities" American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 36, 1999, pp.253-255.
    • David Sosa, "Pathetic Ethics" in Objectivity in Law and Morals (ed) by Brian Leiter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 287-329
  • 5. Naturalism and Non-naturalism
    • Peter Railton, "What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain", in Reality, Representation and Projection (eds.) John Haldane and Crispin Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 279-300.
    • David Wiggins, "Cognitivism, Naturalism, and Normativity" in Reality, Representation and Projection (eds.) John Haldane and Crispin Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 301-314.
    • Peter Railton, "Reply to David Wigginss Cognitivism, Naturalism, and Normativity" in Reality, Representation and Projection (eds.) John Haldane and Crispin Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 315-328.
    • David Wiggins, "A Neglected Position?" in Reality, Representation and Projection (eds.) John Haldane and Crispin Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 329-338.
  • 6. Expressivism
    • Simon Blackburn, "Realism and Variations", chapter 5, sections 1, 2, 3 (part), 6, 7 of
    • Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 20 pages in all.
    • Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit "A Problem for Expressivism" Analysis vol. 58 (1998), pp. 239-251.
    • Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar "Is There a Lockean Argument against Expressivism?" Analysis vol. 63 (2003), pp. 76-86.
  • 7. The Frege-Geach Problem
    • Simon Blackburn "The Frege-Geach Problem", chapter 6, sections 2 and 3 from Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 189-202.
    • G. F. Schueler "Moral Modus Ponens and Moral Realism", Eth