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Mind, Brain, Monism, Dualism
William Hayes Ward, "What i Believe and Why — Eleventh Paper", in The Independent, Volume 79 (Independent Publications, Inc.: July 27, 1914), pp. 126-7.
We know the world of existences and forces under three forms, that of
matter, that of life, and that of thought. In preceding articles I have
indicated how the world of matter and the world of life appear to me
to bear witness to a superior Intelligence which has created or guided
them. I now come to consider whether the world of thought has a similar
origin, or has merely grown, in an evolutionary way, out of the worlds
of matter and life. ¶ The forces of matter, life and thought are totally diverse from each
other. Life is a phenomenon of tremendous significance. It marks an
absolutely different stage in the operation of nature. Physical forces
can give us rocks, mountains, continents, rivers, oceans, winds,
lightning and rain, and their continued operation would reduce the
earth to a degradation of morass and sea. But life brings a new force
which fights physical forces, produces forms vegetable and animal,
which operate and direct to their own ends all physical forces and
exercize a dominance over them. But there is a third stage in the
operations of nature. As organic life is of a different order from
inert matter, so mind is of yet another order from either, and vastly
higher than they. With the animal kingdom there came in mind, not
possest by the physical elements, and no more by the vegetable kingdom.
It is, in some degree, a characteristic of all animal life. The lowest
forms have intelligence enough to feel for their food. As higher forms
appear they learn to avoid danger, to search abroad for their
sustenance, to swim, to fly, to run, till conscious reason appears in
man and is supreme over the course of nature.
J.P. Moreland, on his blog at Amazon.com (June 12, 2008).
Recently, I've been doing a lot of thinking about consciousness and how it might contribute to evidence for the existence of God in light of metaphysical naturalism's failure to provide a helpful explanation. Some of my thinking has culminated in the recently released Consciousness and the Existence of God (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) (Routledge, 2008). Consciousness is among the most mystifying features of the cosmos. Geoffrey Madell opines that "the emergence of consciousness, then is a
mystery, and one to which materialism signally fails to provide an
answer."i
Naturalist Colin McGinn claims that its arrival borders on sheer magic
because there seems to be no naturalistic explanation for it: "How can
mere matter originate consciousness? How did evolution convert the
water of biological tissue into the wine of consciousness?
Consciousness seems like a radical novelty in the universe, not
prefigured by the after-effects of the Big Bang; so how did it contrive
to spring into being from what preceded it?"ii Finally,
naturalist William Lyons argues that "[physicalism] seem[s] to be in
tune with the scientific materialism of the twentieth century because
it [is] a harmonic of the general theme that all there is in the
universe is matter and energy and motion and that humans are a product
of the evolution of species just as much as buffaloes and beavers are.
Evolution is a seamless garment with no holes wherein souls might be
inserted from above."iii
J.P. Moreland, "Naturalism Part IV" in Promise (Sep/Oct 1996), pp. 34-37.
What is the nature of the human person? A mere conglomeration of matter that consists of different levels of brain state or a being that is also endowed with a soul? In this final part of the series on Naturalism, Dr. J. P. Moreland exposes the philosophical inadequacies of physicalism and explains why the Christian message is more convincing.
J.P. Moreland and John Mitchell, Ethics & Medicine 11.3 (1995), pp. 50-55.
In an era where the defence of human rights is prominent, a fundamental
question is who counts as a human person and, more specifically, when
does human personhood begin and end? The answer to the question at both
ends of the spectrum requires metaphysical reflection in three areas: 1. What is a substance and what is a property-thing?; 2.
What does it mean to be a human being?; and 3. What does it mean to be
a human person? In this paper, we will address these questions in order
to lay a metaphysical foundation for ethical decision-making concerning human rights at the edges of life. While the implications of this analysis extend to a variety of ethical issues, we will limit our application to the ontological status of the unborn, and argue that
zygotes, embryos and fetuses (hereafter referred to synonymously) are
fully and equally human beings, and consequently, human persons. We
shall not address the abortion question directly, though we trust the
implications of the arguments presented will become obvious.
J.P. Moreland, Review: Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation by Eugene Fontinell, in Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 32 (June 1989), pp. 244-5.
This work is a technical monograph in pragmatist, process metaphysics. It seeks to answer this question: Given the inadequacies of materialism and classical dualism, can we still believe in personal immortality today? Fontinell answers with a tentative "yes" (in keeping with his pragmatism) by developing a doctrine of the self along Jamesian lines in two steps. Chapters 1-6 focus on the possibility of life after death, and chaps. 7-8 discuss the desirability of an afterlife.
J.P. Moreland in Process Studies, V17, N3, (Fall 1988), pp. 193-9.
It is well known that the various forms of process thought are agreed in denying the existence of an enduring self which maintains absolute identity through change.' Process thought-regardless of whether time is taken to be continuous or discreet, or whether one holds to an A series or B series view of time-is committed to some form of ancestral chain model of the self wherein the self is a series of interrelated actual occasions in which earlier occasions are prehended by later members of the chain toform a serial nexus. There is no stable essence running through all members of the chain; the "persistent" self is a derived unification of momentary selves.
