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What and How We Know or Faith and/or Reason
John Owen, Evenings with the Skeptics: Free Discussion on Free thinkers, Vol. II: Christian Skepticism (Longmans, Green & Co: 1881), p.24.
We begin to perceive, too, what a powerful lever was afforded by the dualism of Faith and Reason for emancipating the human intellect from the thralldom of Ecclesiasticism; for, leaving out of consideration the legitimacy of the instrument, we cannot deny its unrivaled potency. Never was there a more conspicuous instance of the effectiveness of the 'Divide et impera' method. The dogmas of the Church, with their manifold accretions of ignorance and superstition, were found to have lost at least half of their authority and thereby half of the terrorism they had long exercised over humanity. We cannot, I think, feel surprised that the Church from her standpoint of exclusiveness and infallibility should have hurled her anathemas against the authors and propagators of these opinions. Keenness of insight far less prompt than that which has always characterized Romanism might have easily discerned the issue involved in Twofold Truth. It clearly undermined her own position as the divine and sole accredited source of all truth. The verities she chose to stamp with her own brand were to have no longer the exclusive monopoly hitherto assigned them. Philosophy as a rival trader and bidder for the patronage of humanity set up a store of her own, with her own special commodities, authenticated by her own mark, and trader-like did not scruple to boast the superiority of her goods in certain respects to those retailed by the Church. Whatever other effects might attend this rivalry, at least there was opposition — rudimentary free-trade in human dogmas and opinions. A new condition of human liberty was established, which if not destined to bear much fruit for the present was full of promise for the distant future.
John Owen on Human Finitude said...
Evenings with the Skeptics: Free Discussion on Free thinkers, Vol. II: Christian Skepticism (Longmans, Green & Co: 1881), p.13.
Although thinkers in the present day are
taught to regard their minds as the products of that omnipotent
evolution that has educed the whole of natural phenomena, metaphysical
as well as physical, from primæval chaos, there seems still loft ... an
ineradicable instinct to assign it ... an independence and autonomy of
its own. Probably there never existed a race so rude as not to possess
some power of discriminating between the subjective thought and
objective being, between the 'ego' and the 'non-ego.' Thus in man's
most rudimentary relation to the outer world there is postulated a
dualism. No sooner does he begin to think than he recognises himself as
an entity disparate from and even partially opposed to the environment
in which he lives. ... He begins to find that just as he himself forms
an infinitesimally small part of the
universe, so his personal knowledge is utterly incommensurate with the
sum-total of existence, which nevertheless it would fain fathom ... The
thinker rightly regards himself and his knowledge as a
small islet in the immeasurable ocean of the unknown. Moreover, this
conviction of disparity tends to advance with the progress of
knowledge. Every extension of the bounds of the universe, whether in
space or time, enlarges the limits of human Nescience, and the
philosopher is fain to confess, "What I know is a small part of what
might be known" ... Gradually man acquires the
conviction that the known can never be an adequate measure of the
unknown. Indeed the assertion of an inevitable antinomy between man and
the universe is no more than the involuntary homage we are compelled to
render to the infinite possibilities by which we are surrounded, and so
far 'twofold truth' might conceivably claim to be the erection of an
altar to the unknown god. ~ An Excerpt
Anonymous, cited in Evenings with Skeptics (Longmans, Green, Co: 1881), p. 53.
The complete self-surrender of the reason is a partially impossible and wholly self-deceptive
operation. In this endeavour men act unconsciously on the principle of
Ananias. Pretending to resign their whole intellect to a creed or
dogma, they still by an uncontrollable instinct "keep back part of the
price".
The Writings of Thomas Paine (G.P. Putnam: 1896), p. 335.
Why then do you talk of Reason, or refer to it, since your religion has nothing to do with reason, nor reason with that? You tell people as you told Hamilton, that they must have faith! Faith in what? You ought to know that before the mind can have faith in any thing, it must either know it as a fact, or see cause to believe it on the probability of that kind of evidence that is cognizable by reason. But your religion is not within either of these cases; for, in the first place, you cannot prove it to be fact; and in the second place, you cannot support it by reason, not only because it is not cognizable by reason, but because it is contrary to reason. What reason can there be in supposing, or believing that God put himself to death to satisfy himself, and be revenged on the Devil on account of Adam? For, tell the story which way you will it comes to this at last.
"The Great Infidels" (1881)
We have passed midnight in the great struggle between Fact and Faith, between Science and Superstition. The brand of intellectual inferiority is now upon the orthodox brain. There is nothing grander than to rescue from the leprosy of slander the reputation of a good and generous man. Nothing can be nearer just than to benefit our benefactors. The Infidels of one age have been the aureoled saints of the next. The destroyers of the old are the creators of the new. The old passes away, and the new becomes old. There is in the intellectual world, as in the material, decay and growth, and ever by the grave of buried age stand youth and joy. The history of intellectual progress is written in the lives of Infidels. Political rights have been preserved by traitors — the liberty of the mind by heretics. To attack the king was treason — to dispute the priest was blasphemy. The sword and cross were allies. They defended each other. The throne and altar were twins — vultures from the same egg.
"Faith and Reason" in The Journal of Religion, 41 (4) (October 1961), p.238
The Christian message exploded into this scene as an outrage to rationalism. It restored the I-Thou relation to the very center of everything. It proclaimed that a man put to death a few years before in a remote provincial capital was the Son of Almighty God ruling the universe, and he, this man, had atoned by his death for the sins of mankind. It taught that it was the Christian’s duty to believe in this epochal event and to be totally absorbed by its implications. Faith, faith that mocks reason, faith that scornfully declares itself to be mere foolishness in the face of Greek rationalism — this is what Paul enjoined on his audiences. ¶
The picture is well known. But you may ask where I see any trace here of a new Christian, medieval rationalism striving to reconcile faith with reason. It emerged later as the Christian message spread among an intelligentsia steeped in Greek philosophy. It was formulated by Augustine in terms that became statutory for a thousand years after. Reason was declared by him ancillary to faith, supporting it up to the point where revelation took over, after which in its turn faith opened up new paths to reason... the entire movement of scholastic philosophy from Boethius to William of Ockham was but a variation on this theme. ¶ Ockham brought scholasticism to a close by declaring that faith and reason were incompatible and should be kept strictly separate. Thus he ushered in the period of modern rationalism, which, too, accepts this separation, but with the new proviso that reason alone can establish true knowledge. Henceforth, as John Locke was soon to put it, faith was no longer to be respected as a source of higher light, revealing knowledge that lies beyond the range of observation and reason, but was to be regarded merely as a personal acceptance which falls short of rational demonstrability. The mutual position of the two Augustinian levels of truth was inverted.
Thomas Reid on Knowing Thyself said...
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, by Thomas Reid (Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1855), p. xiii.
Mr. Hume has justly observed, that "all the sciences have a relation to
human nature; and, however wide any of them may seem to run from it,
they still return back by one passage or another. This is the centre
and capitol of the sciences, which being once masters of, we may easily
extend our conquests everywhere." The faculties of our minds are the
tools and engines we must use in every disquisition; and the better we
understand their nature and force, the more successfully we shall be
able to apply them.
A Treatise on Human Understanding (Clarendon Press, 1896).
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those who
pretend to discover any thing new to the world in philosophy
and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their
own systems by decrying all those which have been advanced
before them. And indeed were they content with
lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the
most important questions that can come before the tribunal
of human reason, there are few who have an acquaintance
with the sciences that would not readily agree with them. 'Tis easy for one of judgment and learning to perceive
the weak foundation even of those systems which have obtained
the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions
highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles
taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them,
want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole,
these are every where to be met with in the systems of the
most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace
upon philosophy itself.
John Dann MacDonald on Belief said...
A Deadly Shade of Gold (G.K. Hall: 1987), p. 57.
I know just enough about myself to know I cannot settle for one of
those simplifications which indignant people seize upon to make
understandable a world too complex for their comprehension. Astrology,
health food, flag waving, bible thumping, Zen, nudism, nihilism — all
of these are grotesque simplifications which small dreary people adopt
in the hope of thereby finding The Answer, because the very concept
that maybe there is no answer, never has been, never will be, terrifies
them.
The Great Divorce (Simon & Schuster: 1946), 44.
I can promise you none of these things. No atmosphere of inquiry, for I
will bring you to the land not of questions but of answers, and you
shall see the face of God. "Ah, but we must all interpret those
beautiful words in our own way! For me there is no such thing as a
final answer. The free wind of inquiry must always continue to blow
through the mind, must it not? Prove all things, to travel hopeful is
better than to arrive." If that were true, and known to be true, how
could anyone travel hopefully? There would be nothing to hope for. "But
you must feel yourself that there is something stifling about the idea
of finality? Stagnation, my dear boy, what is more soul-destroying than
stagnation?" You think that, because hitherto you have experienced
truth only with the abstract intellect. I will bring you where you can
taste it like honey and be embraced by it as by a bridegroom. Your
thirst shall be quenched.
