Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written essays which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic.

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• 1. We’re Right. They’re Wrong. (Peter van Inwagen)
• 2. Belief in the Face of Controversy (Hilary Kornblith)
• 3. Persistent Disagreement (Catherine Z. Elgin)
• 4. Rational Disagreement Defended (Earl Conee)
• 5. You Can’t Trust a Philosopher (Richard Fumerton)
• 6. Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence (Thomas Kelly)
• 7. How to Disagree About How to Disagree (Adam Elga)
• 8. Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement (Alvin I. Goldman)
• 9. The Moral Evil Demons (Ralph Wedgwood)
• 10. Disputing about Taste (Andy Egan)