Table of Contents

• • Introduction    1
  • 1    Knowing and acting    1
  • 2    Unanalysable knowledge    2
  • 3    Factive mental states    5
  • 4    Knowledge as the justification of belief and assertion    8
  • 5    The myth of epistemic transparency    11
  • 6    Unknowable truths    18
  • 1    A State of Mind    21
  • 1.1    Factive attitudes    21
  • 1.2    Mental states, first-person accessibility, and scepticism    23
  • 1.3    Knowledge and analysis    27
  • 1.4    Knowing as the most general factive mental state    33
  • 1.5    Knowing and believing    41
  • 2    Broadness    49
  • 2.1    Internalism and externalism    49
  • 2.2    Broad and narrow conditions    51
  • 2.3    Mental differences between knowing and believing    54
  • 2.4    The causal efficacy of knowledge    60
  • 3    Primeness    65
  • 3.1    Prime and composite conditions    65
  • 3.2    Arguments for primeness    66
  • 3.3    Free recombination    73
  • 3.4    The explanatory value of prime conditions    75
  • 3.5    The value of generality    80
  • 3.6    Explanation and correlation coefficients    83
  • 3.7    Primeness and the causal order    88
  • 3.8    Non-conjunctive decompositions    89
  • 4    Anti-Luminosity    93
  • 4.1    Cognitive homes    93
  • 4.2    Luminosity    94
  • 4.3    An argument against luminosity    96
  • 4.4    Reliability    98
  • 4.5    Sorites arguments    102
  • 4.6    Generalizations    106
  • 4.7    Scientific tests    109
  • 4.8    Assertibility conditions    110
  • 5    Margins and Iterations    114
  • 5.1    Knowing that one knows    114
  • 5.2    Further iterations    120
  • 5.3    Close possibilities    123
  • 5.4    Point estimates    130
  • 5.5    Iterated interpersonal knowledge    131
  • 6    An Application    135
  • 6.1    Surprise Examinations    135
  • 6.2    Conditionally Unexpected Examinations    143
  • 7    Sensitivity    147
  • 7.1    Preview    147
  • 7.2    Counterfactual sensitivity    148
  • 7.3    Counterfactuals and scepticism    150
  • 7.4    Methods    152
  • 7.5    Contextualist sensitivity    156
  • 7.6    Sensitivity and broad content    161
  • 8    Scepticism    164
  • 8.1    Plan    164
  • 8.2    Scepticism and the non-symmetry of epistemic accessibility    164
  • 8.3    Difference of evidence in good and bad cases    169
  • 8.4    An argument for sameness of evidence    170
  • 8.5    The phenomenal conception of evidence    173
  • 8.6    Sameness of evidence and the sorites    174
  • 8.7    The non-transparency of rationality    178
  • 8.8    Scepticism without sameness of evidence    181
  • 9    Evidence    184
  • 9.1    Knowledge as justifying belief    184
  • 9.2    Bodies of evidence    186
  • 9.3    Access to evidence    190
  • 9.4    An argument    193
  • 9.5    Evidence as propositional    194
  • 9.6    Propositional evidence as knowledge    200
  • 9.7    Knowledge as evidence    203
  • 9.8    Non-pragmatic justification    207
  • 10    Evidential Probability    209
  • 10.1    Vague probability    209
  • 10.2    Uncertain evidence    213
  • 10.3    Evidence and knowledge    221
  • 10.4    Epistemic accessibility    224
  • 10.5    A simple model    228
  • 10.6    A puzzling phenomenon    230
  • 11    Assertion    238
  • 11.1    Rules of assertion    238
  • 11.2    The truth account    244
  • 11.3    The knowledge account    249
  • 11.4    Objections to the knowledge account, and replies    255
  • 11.5    The BK and RBK accounts    260
  • 11.6    Mathematical assertions    263
  • 11.7    The point of assertion    266
  • 12    Structural Unknowability    270
  • 12.1    Fitch’s argument    270
  • 12.2    Distribution over conjunction    275
  • 12.3    Quantification into sentence position    285
  • 12.4    Unanswerable questions    289
  • 12.5    Trans-world knowability    290
  • Appendix 1    Correlation Coefficients    302
  • Appendix 2    Counting Iterations of Knowledge    305
  • Appendix 3    A Formal Model of Slight Insensitivity Almost Everywhere    307
  • Appendix 4    Iterated Probabilities in Epistemic Logic (Proofs)    311
  • Appendix 5    A Non-Symmetric Epistemic Model    316
  • Appendix 6    Distribution over Conjunction    318
  • Bibliography    321
  • Index    333