Whilst virtue ethics has long been a focus for discussion in moral philosophy, it is only recently that an analogue virtue-based theory has come to the fore in the field of epistemology. This volume brings together papers by some of the leading figures working on virtue-theoretic accounts in both ethics and epistemology, including Guy Axtell, Julia Driver, Antony Duff, Miranda Fricker, John Greco, Christopher Hookway, Michael Slote, Lawrence Solum and Linda Zagzebski. It is the first volume to combine papers on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. This volume brings together papers by some of the leading figures working on virtue-theoretic accounts in both ethics and epistemology. A collection of cutting edge articles by leading figures in the field of virtue theory including Guy Axtell, Julia Driver, Antony Duff and Miranda Fricker. The first book to combine papers on both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Deals with key topics in recent epistemological and ethical debate. ~ Product Description

Table of Contents

• • Notes on Contributors
  • 1    Moral and Epistemic Virtues    1
  • 2    The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good    13
  • 3    The Pursuit of Epistemic Good    29
  • 4    Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences    47
  • 5    Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered: A Reply to Eflin    67
  • 6    Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy    75
  • 7    Reply to Hookway    93
  • 8    The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue    101
  • 9    Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project    117
  • 10    Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism    130
  • 11    Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing    139
  • 12    Epistemic Injustice: The Third Way?    159
  • 13    Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging    163
  • 14    The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence    199
  • 15    Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck    210
  • 16    Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology    235
  • 17    Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise    258
  • Index    271