According to the natural law account of practical rationality, the basic reasons for actions are basic goods that are grounded in the nature of human beings. Practical rationality aims to identify and characterize reasons for action and to explain how choice between actions worth performing can be appropriately governed by rational standards. Natural Law and Practical Rationality is a defense of a contemporary natural law theory of practical rationality, demonstrating its inherent plausibility and engaging systematically with rival egoist, consequentialist, Kantian and virtue accounts. ~ Product Description • “An impressive tour de force…Any philosopher doing work in contemporary ethics generally, as well as those doing work specifically in the areas of natural law and practical reason, will benefit enormously from grappling with the vigorous argumentation of this book.” ~ Review of Metaphysics

Table of Contents

• • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction: Natural Law and the Theory of Practical Rationality    1
• 1    The Real Identity Thesis    6
  • 1.1    Rival Views of How Goods Are Known    6
  • 1.2    Functioning and Flourishing    21
  • 1.3    Knowledge of Human Flourishing    34
  • 1.4    The Real Identity Thesis    40
• 2    Well-Being    46
  • 2.1    Natural Law Theory as Welfarist and Objectivist    46
  • 2.2    The Refutation of Conceptual Subjectivism    48
  • 2.3    The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory as the Best Version of Strong Subjectivism    50
  • 2.4    The Refutation of Strong Subjectivism    71
  • 2.5    The Refutation of Weak Subjectivism    76
  • 2.6    ‘Objective List’ Theories    94
• 3    The Reasons That Make Action Intelligible    96
  • 3.1    The List of Goods    96
  • 3.2    Pleasure and Pain    96
  • 3.3    The Basic Goods    100
  • 3.4    Inner Peace, Happiness, and the Hybrid View of the Nature of Well-Being    135
  • 3.5    The Real Identity Thesis Revisited    137
• 4    Welfarism and Its Discontents    139
  • 4.1    Welfarism in the Theory of Practical Rationality    139
  • 4.2    Welfarism Does Not Imply Egoism    140
  • 4.3    Welfarism Does Not Imply a Maximizing Theory of Rationality    142
  • 4.4    Welfarism Does Not Imply Promotionism    147
• 5    The Principles That Make Choice Reasonable    157
  • 5.1    A Justificatory Framework for Principles of Practical Reasonableness    157
  • 5.2    Egoism, Consequentialism, Kantianism    162
  • 5.3    The Nature of Reasons for Action    172
  • 5.4    A Note on Hierarchy among the Basic Goods    190
  • 5.5    Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Plans of Action    198
  • 5.6    Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Agents    208
  • 5.7    Virtue Theory    212
• 6    What Ought to Be Done    220
  • 6.1    ‘Ought’    220
  • 6.2    The Moral ‘Ought’    222
  • 6.3    How Practical Reason Can Err    228
  • 6.4    Moral Dilemmas    240
  • 6.5    Positive Norms, Life Plans, and the Partial Constitution Thesis    246
  • 6.6    Normative Openness and Natural Law Theories of Authority    252
  • Notes    255
  • Works Cited    271
  • Index    279